



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
TREATY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO EURO-
ATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER 1990**

by

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June 2005

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2005	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Its Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security After 1990			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Robert Jurski				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>This thesis examines the influence of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) on security in the European Continent after 1990. This study analyses and describes the origins of the CFE treaty and its development from the late 1990s until signing the CFE agreement during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in November 1990 in Paris. In the history of Europe, the 1990s appear as a turbulent time. The end of the Cold War, collapse of communistic governments in some European countries and efforts of certain states toward NATO membership created a specific background during which armed forces reductions were formulated by the leading powers.</p> <p>This thesis further analyzes the relationship between NATO and the CFE treaty, their mutual cooperation, and describes the approach of selected countries toward the CFE settlement. Its also describes the new strategic shape of Europe influenced directly by resolutions of the CFE treaty. However, this agreement shouldn't be viewed as unanimous. The outcome wasn't achieved easily. Even after November 1990, there was still disagreement within certain nations concerning treaty decisions. Therefore, the main part of thesis focuses on usefulness of the CFE treaty in contemporary European security mechanisms.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS security, Europe, treaty, arms control, verification, CFE, NATO, armaments, inspection,			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 81	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

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**THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY AND ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER 1990**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the influence of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) on security in the European Continent after 1990. This study analyses and describes the origins of the CFE treaty and its development from the late 1960s until signing the CFE agreement during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in November 1990 in Paris. In the history of Europe, the 1990s appear as a turbulent time. The end of the Cold War, collapse of communistic governments in some European countries, and efforts of certain states toward NATO membership created a specific background during which armed forces reductions were formulated by the leading powers.

This thesis further analyzes the relationship between NATO and the CFE treaty, their mutual cooperation, and describes the approach of selected countries toward the CFE settlement. It also describes the new strategic shape of Europe influenced directly by resolutions of the CFE treaty. However, this agreement shouldn't be viewed as unanimous. The outcome wasn't achieved easily. Even after November 1990, there was still disagreement within certain nations concerning treaty decisions. Therefore, the main part of thesis focuses on usefulness of the CFE treaty in contemporary European security mechanisms.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACDA - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ACV - Armored Combat Vehicle

ATTU - Atlantic to the Urals

CBMs - Confidence Building Measures

CDE - Conference on Disarmament in Europe

CFE - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States

CJTF - Combined Joint Task Force

CSBMs - Confidence-and Security-Building Measures

CSCE - Confidence on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

ECP - Enhanced Cooperation Program

EU - European Union

GDR - German Democratic Republic

HLTF - High Level Task Force

HLWG - High Level Working Group

IFOR - Implementation Force (NATO)

JCG - Joint Consultative Group

MBFR - Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSIA - On-Site Inspection Agency

PfP - Partnership for Peace

POET - Protocol of Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment

TLE - Treaty-limited Equipment

UN - United Nations

USAREUR - U.S. Army Europe

VCC - Verification Coordination Committee

VICS - Verification and Implementation Coordination Section

WEU - Western European Union

WTO - Warsaw Treaty Organization

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my professors, Donald Abenheim and Hans-Eberhard Peters, for all the support and guidance they have provided to me. Both professors helped me to understand problems connected with European history and security, not only during the thesis writing process, but also during their classes. Without their assistance, accomplishment of this thesis would be extremely difficult.

Second of all, I'm grateful to the U.S. Department of Defense and Polish Ministry of Defense for giving me a great opportunity to expand my knowledge by studying at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Last but not least, I want to thank my wife, Malgorzata, and my daughter, Weronika, for their understanding and patience in difficult moments of my work. Their encouragement and support motivated me to successfully achieve another goal in my life.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This thesis examines the influence of the Conventional Armed Forces Treaty (CFE) on European security after 1990. While the purpose of this agreement was to eliminate possible military threats between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) by keeping an adequate quantity level of armaments by each side, CFE by itself still is not guaranteed security of the Continent. The period during which the treaty was negotiated appears just as crucial for European security. Between the years when the CFE negotiations were held (1988 – 1990), some European countries confronted additional challenges. The CFE agreement started to be discussed while they were still communistic countries, and was concluded in some cases in democratic states. Such a situation caused a significant number of disagreements between the two sides, which influenced fulfillment of the CFE obligation in terms of agreed deadlines and quality of reductions' tasks. However, in the case of some European countries, the CFE treaty still appears an historical event that initialized the process of joining allies. Additionally, the purpose of this thesis is to make the reader aware that existence of the CFE treaty, as an isolated agreement, is not as significant as in its usefulness in connection with NATO, for example.

B. METHODOLOGY

The thesis is based on introducing and evaluating of significance of the CFE treaty as an agreement that became a fundamental step toward European security after World War II. The material used includes sources related to the CFE treaty in terms of its origins, negotiation, implementation of treaty resolutions, and cooperation with NATO and other political organizations. Simultaneously, this thesis includes information from periodicals, newspapers and journals, and government documents that contain opinions of political and military leaders of European nations. In addition, this thesis cites materials from organizations that deal with security and stability in Europe.

C. CHAPTER OUTLINES

This thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter covers important historical facts concerning the origins, as well as the negotiation phase, of the CFE treaty. The chapter describes the sequence of post-war historical events, which led to the signing of the CFE treaty. Simultaneously, this part of the thesis reflects an effort that has been made by nations and their authorities from the initiation of the conventional balance problem to fundamental negotiations and their conclusion. In addition, this chapter makes the reader aware of fact that after World War II, the large number of conventional armed forces of both Eastern and Western blocs was still considered a threat and, in spite of the final success, the CFE agreement was not easy to achieve.

Chapter III examines the CFE treaty and its influence on security issues after the year 1990. This part of thesis emphasizes the fact that CFE treaty appears as one of the most significant agreements that has been reached since World War II, and its exceptionality is not only an outcome of force reductions in Europe at the beginning of 1990s, but also a reflection of a new era in Europe. In addition, this chapter describes rules of mutual coexistence and cooperation between NATO and the CFE treaty. It shows the viewpoints of selected nations in connection with the CFE agreement considering a highly specific situation during which this document was signed and implemented. Moreover, this chapter describes the new, strategic shape of Europe, which started to be created at the beginning of 1990s. Simultaneously, Chapter III emphasizes the difficult position of some newly democratic states that, being under the communistic regime in the past, became rightful members of NATO. For them, becoming a new member of the alliance required appropriate balancing between the amount of military equipment that was allowed to be kept under the Soviet Union's supervision, as well as under the NATO rules and obligations.

Chapter IV concentrates in answering the following questions: What problems arose after the CFE treaty ratification? What steps have been taken to solve those issues? To what extent was implementation of the treaty effective as far as European security is concerned? Moreover, this part of thesis describes the current status and possible future perspectives of CFE verification in Europe.

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CFE TREATY

A. ORIGINS OF THE CFE TREATY

Europe is a continent significantly experienced by centuries of history, where not only local but also global conflicts were initiated. One of them, World War II, seen as an especially turbulent time in the old continent, was and still is deeply embedded in the awareness of societies. The large number of engaged conventional armed forces of both Eastern and Western blocs was still considered a threat after 1945. In order to decrease the tensions existing after the conflicts between the WTO and NATO, there was a need for a significant reduction of conventional armaments. Finally, an agreement establishing the exact number of conventional armed forces of both sides was reached on November 19, 1990. The CFE treaty, which was signed on this day, appeared not only as a success of diplomacy, but also as a symbolic end of the Cold War period.

However, in spite of the final success, the CFE agreement was not easy to achieve. It required the involvement of a considerable number of politicians, long negotiations, and sometimes compromises.

This Chapter describes the sequence of post-war historical events which led to the signing of the CFE treaty. Simultaneously, this part of the thesis reflects an effort that has been made by nations and their authorities from the initiation of the conventional balance problem to fundamental negotiations and their conclusion.

The late 1960s was a time when both blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, became interested in the arms control issue. Until this time, the main aim of the Soviet Union was eliminating a German military threat. The Soviets wanted to achieve this aim through the neutralization of West Germany and the “unification” of East and West Germany under the control of a communistic regime. The aim of the arms control measures proposed by the Soviet Union was therefore to promote Germany as a state neutralized and controlled by the communist system. Moreover, Soviets wanted to counter Allied initiatives connected with rearmament of West Germany and integration of this state into NATO structures. The viewpoints of the East and West toward arms control were changed in the

mid-1960s.¹ During the years 1966 and 1967, NATO experienced a high inflation rate and, at the same time, Western European countries wanted to reduce the high cost of defense. What is more, American involvement in Vietnam raised the question whether the United States could afford to maintain such a large number of military forces in Europe. The financial pressures, in connection with the general relaxation of tensions with the Soviets, made the arms control measures the best solution for the West to cope with the Warsaw Pact.²

NATO's interest in the simultaneous arms reduction with the Soviet Union became commonly known in the spring of 1967. The following statement was included in the communiqué of the NATO Council during the meeting in Luxemburg: "If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step toward security in Europe. A contribution on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards a reduction of forces would be welcomed as a gesture of peaceful intent."³ This statement reflects the strong need for force reductions in Europe in order to achieve conventional stability.

This stability, according to Laurinda L. Rohn, exists only when, after a balancing of conventional capabilities, both sides are convinced that "(1) neither side can launch a successful attack against the other, and (2) either side can successfully repel any attack launched by the other."⁴

A few historical events, which took place at the turn of the late 1960s and early 1970s, were evidence of insistent aiming at a reduction in armaments in Europe.

One of them was the official offer made by the West to encourage the East to join NATO in order to search for progress toward peace through mutual force reductions. This proposal stated that:

¹ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 2-3.

² Ibid., 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Laurinda L. Rohn, *Conventional Forces in Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and Arms Control* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1990), 63.

Mutual force reductions should be reciprocal and balanced in scope and timing.

Mutual reductions should represent a substantial and significant step, which serve to maintain the present degree of security at reduced cost, but should not be such as risk de-stabilizing the situation in Europe.

Mutual reductions should be consonant with the aim of creating confidence in Europe generally and in the case of each party concerned.

To this end, any new arrangement regarding forces should be consistent with the vital security interests of all parties and capable of being carried out effectively.⁵

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinki Process, was perceived as a background of the CFE treaty negotiations. On July 3, 1973, representatives from 35 countries including the United States, Soviet Union and Canada, met to bridge the political, military and economic division of Europe. This conference was followed by a series of others, which took place in Madrid, Stockholm, and Vienna.⁶ The agreement among the 35 participating nations, known as the Helsinki Final Act, was reached in 1975. The implementation of several Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) connected with military matters was one of the resolutions. These Measures included mainly notification of maneuvers that involved more than 25,000 troops (smaller-scale maneuvers could be notified voluntarily) and voluntary invitation of observers from other countries to take part in these military activities.⁷

The talks were represented by the CSCE from the Eastern side, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations from the Western side. In this process, the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States appeared a significant step toward of mutual force reduction discussions.⁸

⁵ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 5-6.

⁶ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 4.

⁷ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 70-71.

⁸ Ibid., 6-7.

The MBFR negotiations, which started in 1973, were in general focused on proportional reduction of manpower rather than armaments.⁹ These negotiations were based on the following three principles established in the initial phase of the talks:

The general objective of the negotiations is to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe without diminishing the security of any party to the negotiations.

The subject matter of the negotiations is to be ‘mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe.’

The area of force reduction is the territory of seven countries: the two Germanies, the Western states of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg; and the Eastern states of Poland and Czechoslovakia.¹⁰

In addition, another agreement stated that only nations who possess troops within the affected countries would be obliged to obey the subsequent resolutions. That’s why the Western bloc was represented by the United States, West Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and Benelux. The participants from the Eastern side included, as mentioned before, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and additionally, the Soviet Union and East Germany. Another group of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that took part in the negotiations (Italy, Hungary, Norway, Greece, Denmark, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) was given a status of special participants.¹¹

However, it should be realized that these negotiations did not proceed smoothly or without disagreements. There were a few areas within which an agreement could barely be reached.

First of all, the number of troops deployed in central Europe by each bloc was an issue on which both sides were not able to reach agreement. Second of all, according to observers of the MBFR talks, the Soviet Union was against any reduction of its military power within the territory of Eastern Europe. It was a conviction that even an innocuous agreement, from the military point of view, that somehow violating the political

⁹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 2-3.

¹⁰ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 7-8.

¹¹ Ibid., 8.

asymmetry in Europe, would be rejected by authorities in order to prevent the continent from Western influence. Finally, the reasons mentioned above made the MBFR negotiation more symbolic and diplomatic than serious.¹²

It should be realized that the MBFR talks took place during a period when the relations between the West and East were not very friendly, and the negotiations appeared as the only functioning forum between the Western and Eastern blocs. Between the years 1979 and 1983, any agreement concerning arms control was not reached. This period of time was mainly dominated by the Polish crisis and reaction to the involvement of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.¹³ After more than a decade of negotiations, only the general agreement about the types of elements that should be included in the MBFR treaty had been reached, while a large number of crucial issues were still unsolved.¹⁴

Another historical event that significantly influenced future conventional-force negotiations was the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which took place between the years 1984 and 1986. The reduction and changes within the military armed forces, however, was not the aim of this conference. This meeting was mainly focused on issues concerning reduction of the risk of war and implementation of confidence building and “transparency” measures. These aspects were reflected in the final Stockholm Document signed by the 35 participating states.¹⁵

Another significant issue that paved the way for the CFE treaty was a noticeable change in the Soviet Union’s policy in 1986.

On April 18, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev gave his speech calling for the new negotiations concerning armed forces reduction. He stated that:

Agreement [should] be reached on substantial reductions in all components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European states and the relevant forces of the USA and Canada deployed in Europe. The

¹² Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 3-4.

¹³ Graeme P. Auton, *Arms Control and European Security* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 106.

¹⁴ William R. Bowman, *Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 11.

¹⁵ Graeme P. Auton, *Arms Control and European Security* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 98-99.

formations and units to be reduced should be disbanded and their weaponry either destroyed or stored in national territories. Geographically, reductions, obviously, should cover the entire European territory from the Atlantic to the Urals.¹⁶

This speech indicated that the problem of conventional armed forces control was becoming more and more essential to the government of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ Moreover, Gorbachev's policy was significantly different from the Soviet policies of the past. On one hand, such a radical turn in policy was even viewed by the Western alliance as a good opportunity for improving conventional capabilities of NATO in comparison with the Warsaw Pact.¹⁸ On the other hand, there was little optimism that the "new thinking" of Gorbachev would be similar to conceptions represented by the West. What is more, such a policy was considered by a majority of Western officials and analysts as suspicious.¹⁹

The issue of strengthening the security and stability on the European continent by armed forces reductions was on the agenda of the NATO foreign ministers meeting, which took place in Halifax in May 1986.²⁰ During this meeting, as a response to Gorbachev's speech on April 18, 1986, the High Level Task Force (HLTF) for conventional arms control was established. It is worth mentioning that France's participation in the HLTF and filling of the "empty chair" was compensation for not attending the MBFR talks. In order to secure the attendance of France during the negotiations, the newly-created HLTF was not formally subordinated to NATO.²¹ The HLTF was an organ, which was responsible for developing a coordinated alliance proposal for the conventional arms reduction treaty.²² However, representatives from

¹⁶ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 27.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ Committee on Armed Services, *Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense*, 100th Cong., 1 st sess., 1987. 243.

²¹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 14.

²² Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 6.

Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United States were members of an informal executive committee known as the “Quint”, created within the HLTF. Although the smaller members of the alliance didn’t know about the existence of the “Quint”, the majority of HLTF compromises have been previously reached within the confines of the “Quint.”²³ After long and difficult discussions among the 16-nation alliance, in December 1986, a proposition for negotiating a two-track (finally adopted) strategy was established. While one of them concerned Confidence-Building Measures in a broader and more open context by the 35 CSCE participating nations, the second one was tasked to discuss conventional force stability provisions, as well as phases of reduction between NATO and WTO nations.²⁴

On June 11 of the same year, the leaders from the Warsaw Pact met in Budapest in order to reaffirm and clarify Gorbachev’s speech given in April 1986. The communiqué, known as the “Budapest Appeal,” issued during this meeting introduced the plan of Soviet policy of conventional arms control for the next three years. This plan included, among others, suggestions concerning the level of armaments and personnel reductions, strengthening Confidence-and Security-Building Measures, verification provisions, and stabilizing measures.²⁵ Simultaneously, apart from conventional force matters, the participants of the “Budapest Appeal” called for negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons within the ATTU territory.²⁶ However, it should be understood that the West was not always enthusiastic about the “Budapest Appeal”. Some politicians were concerned that it could be designed for goals different from those mentioned above.

²³ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 15.

²⁴ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 6-7.

²⁵ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 27-28.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Charles H. Thomas,²⁷ in his statement said that "...the Budapest appeal calls for equal NATO-Warsaw Pact reductions, which would leave NATO in a weaker position. The Soviets also want to mix tactical nuclear system into these conventional talks. They hope in this way to pursue their objective of denuclearizing Europe through the backdoor, as it were.²⁸"

Shortly after the "Budapest Appeal", in December 1986, NATO announced its willingness to join preparatory talks with the WTO concerning a new stage of armed forces negotiations. Those talks took the form of meetings in Vienna, during which CSCE delegates from twenty-three members of the WTO and NATO were accompanied by disarmament experts. Starting with the first meeting on February 17, 1987, the CFE mandate appeared as the main topic on the agenda. In spite of the fact that ideas introduced in the "Budapest Appeal" were coherent to the Western concept of arms control, there were still a few issues that needed to be resolved before the beginning of the CFE negotiations. The armaments subjected to the talks, the goals of negotiations, participating states, the connections of the new talks with CSCE and demarcation territories in which the treaty would apply appeared as the most important matters.²⁹ The West, however, identified the source of instability in Europe with the Warsaw Pact's forces stating that "since NATO considered the Warsaw Pact's forces to be the source of instability in Europe, and its own forces to be a source of stability, the basic structural objective of the new talks should be to reduce the forces of the WTO by a substantial amount and the forces of NATO by a token amount, if at all.³⁰"

In spite of existing confusion about the Soviet Union's policy towards arms control, the late 1980s once again confirmed the superpower's willingness to introduce significant cuts in armaments.

²⁷ Committee on Armed Services, *Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense*, 100th Cong., 1 st sess., 1987. 242.

²⁸ Ibid., 244.

²⁹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 29.

³⁰ Ibid., 30.

On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations that significantly contributed to the acceleration of the CFE process.³¹ He announced the reduction of 5,000 tanks and six divisions within the Soviet units stationed in Eastern Europe.³² From NATO's point of view, these forces were considered the main threat to the alliance. At the same time, other members of the Warsaw Pact introduced considerable defense budget cuts (in the range of 10-17 percent), which caused a simultaneous reduction of military forces.³³ In addition, the massive withdrawal of forces reflected the weakening bonds between the Warsaw Pact members.³⁴

The language used in the CFE mandate, which was finally signed on January 10, 1989 in Vienna, indicates that most of the concessions connected with CFE matters were made by the WTO. According to the CFE mandate, the conventional armaments and equipment based on land (excluding chemical and nuclear weapons and naval forces) should be subjected to negotiations. In addition, even the existence of multiple capabilities (other than conventional) of some conventional weapons would not exclude this equipment from negotiations, and would not be the matter of creating a separate category for it. The CFE mandate, signed by the sixteen NATO members and seven Warsaw Pact members, was a brief prelude of upcoming talks. Simultaneously, it almost perfectly converged with preferences of the alliance and violated every principle that characterized the policy of arms control after the Stalin era. What is more, the CFE mandate emphasized that every country taking part in negotiations would act as an individual state and not as a member of an alliance.³⁵ The mandate finally paved the way for CFE negotiations that started two months later.

³¹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 24-25.

³² Congressional Budget Office, *Budgetary and Military Effects of a Treaty Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe*, 1990. 9.

³³ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 25-26.

³⁴ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 9.

³⁵ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 33-36.

B. FROM NEGOTIATION TO SIGNING THE CFE TREATY

The negotiation between the twenty-three states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact began in Vienna, on March 9, 1989.³⁶ According to the mandate, during the discussion, the conventional armed forces within Atlantic-to-the Urals (ATTU) area were taken under consideration.³⁷ The concentration of military forces in this area was the highest ever known during peacetime. Moreover, the conventional armaments signified the greatest military potential ever accumulated. The objectives of the CFE negotiations between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were connected mainly with the establishment of a stable and secure lower-level balance of conventional armed forces and the elimination of a capability for launching a surprise attack or starting a large-scale offensive action.³⁸ NATO's proposal concerning its amount of military equipment, which included categories such as ACVs, artillery and tanks, was approximately 10 percent below the level of NATO armaments.³⁹ In spite of certain objections to NATO's proposal, ceilings of some categories proposed by the Warsaw Pact were identical to those of the West.⁴⁰ (as indicated in the table below).

³⁶ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 1989. 1.

³⁷ Charles T. Kelley, Jr., *Methodology for Examining Effects of Arms Control Reduction on Tactical Air Forces: An Example from Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty Analysis* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1993), 1.

³⁸ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 1989. 1.

³⁹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 47.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

Table 1. Equal NATO and Warsaw Pact Limits in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals

	NATO PROPOSAL	WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
MAIN BATTLE TANKS	20,000	20,000
ARTILLERY	16,500	24,000
ARMORED TROOP CARRIERS	28,000	28,000
COMBAT AIRCRAFT*	5,700	1,500
COMBAT HELICOPTERS	1,900	1,700
MANPOWER	NATO proposal addresses U.S. and Soviet manpower only, with U.S. and Soviet ground and air stationed manpower levels in Europe to be limited to 275,000 each.	1,350,000

*NATO's proposed ceiling refers to total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. The ceiling reflects a far broader definition of combat aircraft than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling for "strike" aircraft only.

Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *CFE Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 1989. 3.

The late 1980s abounded with many historical events, which significantly influenced the CFE negotiations. Some politicians saw German unification as a threat, which could violate European security and stability. Such a way of thinking forced them to undertake principal steps toward assuring peace on the Continent.

During the Soviet-American summit, which took place in May 1990, President Bush introduced a "nine point plan" in order to assuage the Soviet Union's fear which was the outcome of possible consequences of German unification. In accordance with the second point of this plan, NATO was prepared to discuss further limitations of personnel directly after the achievement of CFE. However, such assurances were not sufficient for the Soviet Union. In July 1990, during NATO's summit in London, known as the

London Declaration, the alliance reiterated its pledge to negotiate issues connected with manpower.⁴¹

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist government of the German Democratic Republic, Germany became recognized as a single, united nation, which became a fact on October 3, 1990. United Germany's possession of the largest air force and national army in Central Europe was a serious concern for treaty negotiators. However, the special declaration issued by Germany promised considerable cuts in troop strengths, and simultaneously encouraged other European nations to discuss their conventional armed forces limits. At the same time, when the communist regime collapsed in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Hungary, Soviet troops were leaving the territory of Eastern Europe.⁴²

Including some pieces of military equipment in the total number of conventional armed forces was another issue to resolve before the signing of the CFE treaty. The disagreement over the definition of a combat aircraft is a good example that illustrates this problem.

While NATO, focusing on its capabilities wanted to limit the number of the aircraft by the treaty, Eastern states, categorizing this equipment by mission (not connected with the supporting of ground forces), were against including this aircraft in the treaty. Finally, an agreement was reached after a discussion between U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who met in New York City in late September 1990. Ultimately, each group of states was allowed to keep 6,800 combat aircraft.⁴³ By October 1990, the majority of agreements concerning the CFE treaty had been achieved. A significant (and even too large) number of them, according to other signatories, were an outcome of bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Since that time delegates from European states started to meet among themselves, which strengthened the perspective of finalizing the

⁴¹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 71-72.

⁴² Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 8-9.

⁴³ Ibid., 16-17.

CFE treaty as well as its implementation. The CFE treaty became a document ready to sign when representatives achieved a final agreement on all provisions.⁴⁴

Finally, during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place in the middle of November 1990, in Paris, the leaders of 22 countries signed the CFE treaty.⁴⁵ The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990.⁴⁶ “At that point, the signatory states included Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.⁴⁷”

The CFE treaty consists of 23 articles, 8 protocols, and 3 declarations. The articles introduce aspects connected with treaty definitions and requirements connected with equipment, time periods and locations. The protocols contain procedural guidance with reference to requirements presented in the 23 articles.⁴⁸ Ultimately, the three declarations mentioned above apply to land-based naval aircraft and attack helicopters,⁴⁹ personnel strength⁵⁰ and personnel strength of German Armed Forces.⁵¹

There is no denying that the signing of the CFE treaty was one of the most significant events which took place in Europe after World War II. This document appeared as a helpful tool to prevent possible conflicts on the European continent that could arise. Simultaneously, the treaty is a symbol of the end of the Cold War, which considerably influenced some countries that later on became treaty signatories.

⁴⁴ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 12-13.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 18.

⁵¹ On-Site Inspection Agency, *Treaty Between the Twenty Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of their Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 19 November 90, 112.

Apart from being a conflict-preventive treaty, the CFE agreement caused the reduction of more than 38,500 armaments (see tables below). At the same time, the treaty's verification measures appeared as the most detailed and complex in comparison with other arms control agreements.⁵² However, there was a need for modernization of the CFE treaty in order to adapt it to the changes, which were initiated by the last years of the Cold War.⁵³

Table 2. NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities

TLE	CFE Limit	Declared	Liability*	Percentage of Holdings
Tanks	20,000	25,091	5,949	24%
Artillery	20,000	20,620	2,334	11%
ACVs	30,000	34,453	4,631	13%
Aircraft	6,800	5,939	0	0%
Helicopters	2,000	1,736	0	0%

*Collectively, NATO nations set their CFE limits below the treaty limits. All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.

Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 20.

Table 3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities*

TLE	CFE Limit	Declared	Liability	Percentage of Holdings
Tanks	20,000	33,191	13,191	40%
Artillery	20,000	26,953	6,953	26%
ACVs	30,000	42,949	12,949	30%
Aircraft	6,800	8,372	1,572	19%
Helicopters	2,000	1,701	0	0%

*All figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange.

Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 21.

⁵² Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 1.

⁵³ Editorial and Publications Department. Zdzislaw Lachowski, *The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO*, http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/CFE_Treaty_report.pdf (accessed Apr, 23, 2005).

Table 4. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990

Nation	Tanks	Artillery	ACVs	Combat Aircraft	Attack Helicopters
Warsaw Treaty Organization States					
USSR	20,694	13,828	29,348	6,445	1,330
Bulgaria	2,416	2,474	2,010	387	44
Czechoslovakia	3,035	3,485	4,359	369	56
Hungary	1,345	1,047	1,720	110	39
Poland	2,850	2,300	2,377	654	128
Romania	2,851	3,819	3,135	407	104
Total WTO	33,191	26,953	42,949	8,372	1,701
NATO States					
Belgium	359	376	1,282	191	0
Canada	77	38	277	45	12
Denmark	419	553	316	106	3
France	1,358	1,330	4,125	700	429
Germany	7,133	4,644	9,598	1,064	357
Greece	1,725	1,941	1,639	480	0
Italy	1,912	2,222	3,591	584	169
Netherlands	913	838	1,467	196	91
Norway	205	532	146	90	0
Portugal	146	334	259	96	0
Spain	854	1,373	1,259	252	28
Turkey	2,888	3,202	1,554	589	0
UK	1,198	636	3,193	842	368
USA	5,904	2,601	5,747	704	279
Total NATO	25,091	20,620	34,453	5,939	1,736

Source: Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 76.

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III. CFE TREATY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SECURITY ISSUES SINCE 1990

A. FITTING NATO AND THE CFE RESOLUTION TOGETHER

The CFE treaty appears as the one of the most significant agreements that has been reached since World War II. Its exceptionality is not only an outcome of force reductions in Europe at the beginning of 1990s, but also a reflection of a new era in Europe. This is the time when the Soviet Union was dissolved and divided into new independent states. The Russian military forces inherited after the great Soviet empire, as well as the internal situation within all newly created countries, influenced the security in Europe considerably. It was a highly specific situation during which the CFE treaty was signed and implemented. Moreover, Europe at the beginning of 1990s was a place where a lot of countries introduced democratic political systems, which in some cases changed the general view on security on the Continent. In addition, during the last years of the twentieth century, few democratic states became rightful members of NATO. Their membership required the appropriate balancing between the number of military equipment that was allowed to be kept under the communistic regime, and according to NATO rules and obligations. All those aspects mentioned above made the CFE treaty difficult to accommodate and implement. The revolution in European armaments caused the creation of new strategic centers in Europe, as well as a totally different approach toward its security. This Chapter examines the CFE treaty and its influence on security issues after the year of 1990.

The CFE treaty was signed on November 19, 1990, by the 16 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and six members of the Warsaw Pact. This agreement required significant cuts in the military equipment located on the European continent. According to initial plans, the Warsaw Pact was obliged to destroy over 34,500 pieces of equipment (tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft), which represented more than 30 percent of its arsenal. At the same time, NATO pledged to destroy 3,700 armaments, which represented only 5 percent of its total number of

military equipment. Additionally, both blocs agreed to conduct extensive inspections in order to ensure compliance with the signed treaty.⁵⁴

The reduction of forces under the CFE treaty was not easy, especially for Russia, the main successor of the Soviet Union, which still had large numbers of military equipment deployed abroad.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the balance of military forces in Europe was shifted in NATO's favor because of recent political changes and the potential benefits of the CFE treaty. For example, in 1988, the advantage of Warsaw Pact nations over the NATO countries was 1.5 to 1.⁵⁵

The numbers mentioned above reflect the large scale of force reductions after 1990. It was (and still is) a great challenge to facilitate NATO demands and the CFE resolutions.

NATO, as well as the CFE treaty, has been undergoing some changes during the post-Cold War era. In general, NATO conducts operations and projects power away from the previous concentration of stationary defense. Moreover, it created its own pattern in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to refine these states' ability to undertake cooperation in military operations and to use the NATO's offices in promoting democratic standards in the partner states. Simultaneously, it established new military command structures, developed Western European Union (WEU) mission profiles and joint task force headquarters (CJTF), which are still tested.⁵⁶

After signing the CFE treaty, NATO started to support former Warsaw Pact countries to implement the resolutions of the CFE agreement. Although limited, the aid to post-communist nations was based on funding and conducting the CFE training courses and discussing ways to improve treaty implementation during seminars.⁵⁷ In 1993 and 1994, 80 participants from national verification agencies took part in different courses at

⁵⁴ Committee on Foreign Relations, *The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 345.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 13.

⁵⁷ Report to Congressional Requesters, *Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation's Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control*, December 1993, 24.

the NATO school at Oberammergau, Germany. Other inspectors from the Eastern bloc took advantage of participation in the NATO course on monitoring CFE reductions, which was offered at the Belgian Military Camp at Leopoldville.⁵⁸ From 1992 through 1996, these seminars, which were for directors and higher staffs of the national verification agencies, were sponsored by NATO's Verification Coordination Committee (VCC). Their main goal was to raise the issues of the CFE implementation process as well as to discuss common matters and approaches connected with it.⁵⁹

At the same time, inspectors from the former Warsaw Pact nations were being included on some inspection teams led by NATO.⁶⁰ The multinational teams took part in inspections conducted in Eastern Europe. In 1993, all the CFE inspections led by NATO started to work as multinational.⁶¹ Sometimes, the participation of representatives from the Soviet bloc countries in inspections could be seen as an awkward situation.

It was observed by the Director of the German Federal Armed Forces Verification Center, Brigadier General Heinz Loquai, that,

At first it was not so easy for the inspected countries, especially the former Warsaw Pact countries, to understand why guest inspectors were coming along with the [NATO nation] inspection teams. But in my opinion, the participation of the guest inspectors is a good development. Germany has opened more than 50 percent of all its inspections for the guest inspectors.⁶²

The statement of the Director of NATO's Verification and Implementation Coordination Section (VICS), about extremely good mutual cooperation during inspections, initiated other cooperative ideas. In June 1994, a statement to NATO issued by VCC allowed Western inspectors to join Eastern-led CFE inspections teams in order to conduct East-on-East verification.⁶³

⁵⁸ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 253.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 227-228.

⁶⁰ Report to Congressional Requesters, *Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation's Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control*, December 1993, 24.

⁶¹ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 227.

⁶² Ibid., 253.

⁶³ Ibid.

In order to reduce the classic cost of destroying military equipment, the countries representing the two blocs agreed to implement new methods (proposed earlier by Russia, Ukraine and Romania) for destroying tanks and armored combat vehicles. This resolution appeared not only as a reasonable solution for reducing the cost of destroying equipment, but also was a time saving method.⁶⁴

The sponsoring of inspectors' training, conducting seminars and including instructors from the Eastern bloc on inspection teams was not the only help provided by NATO members.

Additionally, U.S. officials were helping former Soviet republics by visiting their capitals in order to estimate the treaty implementation needs and to provide supplementary hints. These trips resulted in providing six former Soviet republics (CFE signatories) with computers, software and training for a CFE-related communication network.⁶⁵

In 1994, during the time when the treaty nations agreed to share data from on-site inspections, NATO nations helped them by expanding VERITY – the computerized database. This system was responsible mainly for gathering information about the national forces of almost all treaty states, as well as inspections.⁶⁶ Apart from 24 hour availability of VERITY at NATO Headquarters, this system was simultaneously identified as electronic mail. Moreover, the majority of NATO countries found it helpful in preparing for the verification mission.⁶⁷

Another issue that arose after the signing of the CFE treaty in 1990 was the enlargement of NATO. While a democratic system was introduced in some European countries, few of them were trying (mostly successfully) to become rightful members of the alliance.

⁶⁴ Report to Congressional Requesters, *Conventional Arms Control: Former Warsaw Pact Nation's Treaty Compliance and U.S. Cost Control*, December 1993, 24.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 227.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 254.

The inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary within the NATO structures appeared as the most remarkable post-Cold War alliance development. In spite of this fact, NATO has worked hard to more strongly develop its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the Partnership for Peace (PfP).⁶⁸

It was expected that NATO growth would influence the balance of conventional forces set up by the CFE treaty. It was supposed that three future members of the alliance might want to negotiate changes within the CFE agreement due to the expansion of NATO and the decreasing of the old Eastern bloc.⁶⁹

However, it should be realized that countries that applied for NATO membership, in some cases, were opposing the reduction of military equipment inside their territories.

In 1997, U.S. government officials stated that "...The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, despite signing NATO accession protocol on December 16, are hesitant to accept lower limits until they are full members of NATO..."⁷⁰

Moreover, in the case of NATO enlargement by three European states, the stationing of alliance forces on the territory of those countries would be another issue to discuss as far as the number of equipment allowed by the CFE treaty. The constraints concerning the appropriate number of deployed armaments would arise from NATO's and host states' sides.⁷¹

The issue of leaving the former Soviet bloc by Eastern Europeans countries, and their membership in NATO, created questions regarding how the destruction obligations created by the CFE treaty will be changed.⁷²

⁶⁸ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 14.

⁶⁹ Sarah Walking, "NATO paper outlines approach to CFE treaty 'modernization,'" *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 26, no. 8 (October 1996): 25.

⁷⁰ Wade Boese, "NATO proposes lower CFE ceilings not requiring actual force cuts," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 27, no. 8 (November/December 1997): 25.

⁷¹ Columbia International Affairs Online. Richard G. Lugar, Victoria Nuland, *Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO*, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/lur01/index.html> (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

⁷² Committee on Foreign Relations, *The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 222.

Former Secretary of State James Addison Baker, in response to this matter, stated that:

Eastern European states enthusiastically support the treaty and worked successfully to provisions of special interest to them. They will benefit in general from the stable security framework, including the vastly increased transparency, established by CFE. In particular, they will benefit from the Soviet reductions and limits that the treaty requires and the legally-binding multilateral framework it provides to lock in Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe...⁷³

Moreover, Baker claimed that both Eastern European states and the Soviets are obliged to conduct large equipment reductions according to the “sufficiency rule” proposed by NATO. This rule was an assurance that the other Eastern states, distinct from prior to the CFE period, will always have at least about one-third of the entire Eastern allowances ready to divide among themselves. What is more, the treaty’s provisions promote Eastern European independence from the Soviets, and prohibit a state from deploying its own forces on the territory of another state without its agreement. The Soviet Union itself could be inspected by Central and Eastern European countries.⁷⁴

According to Baker,

if one of the East European states were to announce its intention to leave its Group of States or to join the other Group (NATO), an extraordinary conference would no doubt be requested. [...] Signatories would have to decide at this conference how to deal with the situation...⁷⁵

In his speech, Michael Guhin, Deputy Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)⁷⁶ stated that

...CFE probably would have been adapted in some form or other without NATO enlargement, I would suspect. But the fact that we are faced with looking at NATO enlargement, I think, provides an additional and a very key incentive. The reason I say that is that CFE is one mechanism by

⁷³ Committee on Foreign Relations, *The CFE Treaty: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 102nd Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 222.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)* (Washington, DC, 1997), III.

which the United States and NATO allies can help assure or provide Russia with greater confidence that NATO expansion is not going to be threatening to them...⁷⁷

However, NATO enlargement was not only identified as a good supplement to the CFE treaty. The disagreements were mainly the outcome of significant changes that took place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

John E. Peters, in his book titled “CFE and Military Stability in Europe,” expressed his opinion that NATO enlargement was seen as a process with negative impact on CFE. It was expected that Russian concerns about the CFE could have broader results as far as European security is concerned. Russia was supposed to have to demand some changes in the CFE treaty that concern the main decisions. It was even expected that this country could scrap the settlement under excessive circumstances.⁷⁸ According to John E. Peters,

stability would suffer because of the Russian perception that East-West competition had been restarted. Moscow would probably assess NATO as an expansionist, anti-Russian entity and determine to contain it. Despite her paucity of resources, Russia would do what she could to undermine further regional stability, to shore up her frontiers, and to restore her ability to confront the West. This competition would create new incentives for Moscow to resist the expansion of Western influence and to offset NATO expansion with initiatives of her own: perhaps limited arms racing and alignment with other extra-European, anti-Western forces, for example. NATO enlargement would thus be bad not only for the CFE Treaty but for European stability as a whole.⁷⁹

Another matter, which is connected with fitting both NATO and CFE together, is their modernization and propositions for distributing Treaty-limited equipment (TLE). The aspects mentioned above were significantly influenced by the break-up of Soviet Union.

Any factor that would reduce NATO’s aggregate allocations, even in spite of its enlargement, would have potentially dangerous consequences on the alliance. According to John E. Peters, problems with TLE as well as the process of Confidence-and Security-

⁷⁷Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)* (Washington, DC, 1997), 6.

⁷⁸ John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 18.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 18-19.

Building Measures (CSBMs), is caused by their abilities to constrain NATO deployments and conducted operations. It is commonly known that Russia does not support the stationing of NATO forces in Central Europe. There is a possibility of Russia and other countries demanding to introduce proposals that would limit the number of multinational operations. In other words, a limited number of troops from a limited number of countries would take part in certain operations. This would undermine wide participation in alliance's activities and could be significant for all NATO's options of establishing its command structures and strategic concepts. Moreover, any attempts to modernize NATO would be destructive to the key attributes of CFE. At the same time, some of the options of CFE adaptation constitute obstacles that could limit NATO-modernization options.⁸⁰

The withdrawal of Soviet conventional forces from the territory of the Central Front considerably strengthened the position of the alliance in this region. Moreover, the main goal of the decentralization of Soviet forces in Central and Eastern Europe has been achieved. However, this connection between the goals of NATO and arms verification lasted a short period of time. In spite of the CFE treaty implementation process, which was in progress, the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was a motivating power. During the period of European transition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe was facilitated by the new direction taken by the CFE treaty. The CFE agreement considered new important issues that arose during this time – the possible threat caused by German unification and the possibility of restarting the arms race in Europe. After all, it became clear that in order to strengthen stability in Europe, there is a need for modernization of the CFE and NATO.⁸¹

The stability in Europe is the main factor explaining the coexistence and cooperation of the CFE and NATO. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the rules and restrictions of both – the alliance and the CFE agreement, stability can be achieved by considering a few key aspects.

Timothy Wallace Crawford, in his book titled “Strategic Architecture and the Dilemma of Dual-Modernization,” determines four mechanisms of stability. The first one

⁸⁰ John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 20.

⁸¹ Timothy Wallace Crawford, *Strategic architecture and the Dilemma of Dual-Modernization: How to Harmonize CFE Reform and NATO Enlargement*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1997), 1-2.

– system stability – is explained as sharing common interests by the most powerful European countries in order to preserve the status quo in Europe before procedures connected with arms control take part. Strategic stability is described by the author as the ability to reduce levels of forces between two blocs without giving the Soviets the chance to modify the Cold War settlement in Europe. This point of view is an argument against hasty NATO enlargement, which can be done without considering adjustments to the security structure in Europe. Such a situation can initiate a defensive response from the Russian Federation. Another kind of stability described by Crawford is dense stability. In this case, countries are encouraged to collaborate in the spirit of “cooperative security” and “institutional enmeshment.” This type of stability suggests that NATO membership can be used as a method of European integration. In some cases being a member of the alliance can lead to EU membership. Deep stability is the last variant of stability introduced by the author. It is usually recognized as adopting by countries liberal democratic forms of government. The democratic identity, harmonization of interests, common goals and recognition of legitimacy of other democratic governments, are the main factors that constitute the idea of deep stability.⁸²

Finally, Crawford recognizes the following three options of possible dual-modernization of NATO and CFE:

- “Reconstruct CFE, Conditional NATO Enlargement;
- Reform CFE, Restrain NATO Enlargement;
- CFE Redux, Robust NATO Enlargement.⁸³”

The appropriate balance between NATO and CFE is indispensable for strengthening security and stability in Europe. However, the contemporary political and economical situation on the Continent makes this task not easily achievable.

In order to reach such a unity between those two institutions, some of the forms each organization might take should be taken under consideration.

⁸² Timothy Wallace Crawford, *Strategic architecture and the Dilemma of Dual-Modernization: How to Harmonize CFE Reform and NATO Enlargement*, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1997), 4-7.

⁸³ Ibid., 17-29.

The CFE treaty with its mechanisms is not sufficient for solving today's problems, such as crises within countries and friction between neighbors. The enlargement of its membership and its influence on stability in Europe is doubtful. One of the possible ways the CFE treaty can take is the process of harmonizing its functions with other European security institutions. Moreover, even sub-regional measures could be undertaken in the case of some troubled territories. The "flank agreement" (described in the fourth chapter of this thesis), for example, can be an initiation for signing the regional arms pacts in the future by nations such as Norway and Turkey, for which this problem appears as a key issue. Nevertheless, the Dayton Accords proved that some sub-regional agreements can be seen doubtfully.⁸⁴

The most promising option for CFE is continuity in conducting deeper reductions of Treaty-limited equipment, increasing the number of conducted inspections, as well as further steps taken within the area of confidence- and stability-building. The option of CFE enlargement could be influential in extending stability in European territories. Moreover, in comparison with the Vienna Document 1994, the CFE treaty is considered an institution that proposes a greater level of confidence in the stability of certain regions. What is more, it is the key institution that precisely monitors military actions that take place within the member states.⁸⁵

According to John E. Peters, NATO as an institution is more flexible than the CFE treaty described above and has three main options. First of all, countries that are the members of the alliance have a possibility of organizing themselves in order to give a group response to the potential threat. In spite of the fact that those operations can have a NATO or non-NATO character (IFOR in Bosnia or Alba in Albania), the timely responses and lack of forces for unexpected contingency situations can cause problems. As a second option, Peters introduces the establishment of standing crisis response instruments within NATO structures. In this case, the main inconvenience would be that the country that is responsible for providing different kinds of military services (communications, headquarters, etc.) might have no interest in the dissolution of a

⁸⁴ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 15-16.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 16-17.

conflict in certain areas, which in consequence can lead to the delaying of deployment. Finally, the last option given by the author is the idea of the creation of a command responsible for crisis response and power projection, which would be available in a short time period (less than 60 days). Placing forces in positions without knowing the sources of a specific case, as well as funds paid for relocation, reorganization and equipment of forces, would make this option quite expensive.⁸⁶

Bearing in mind all the possible options for NATO and CFE, there is a need to skillfully combine them to fit the European security demands.

Keeping European arsenals small enough by restriction of CFE treaty appears a reasonable solution between those two institutions. In this case, all potential conflicts that could arise would be successfully managed by NATO, as long as they are small in size and limited in geographical territory. At the same time, there is a need for using modest sized forces in contemporary military operations. The deployment of troops in Chechnya (in late 1994, Moscow deployed 40,000 troops, 230 tanks, 388 artillery pieces⁸⁷), for example, didn't take advantage of large inventories of TLE. Despite the fact that CFE was not so helpful in local conflicts after 1990, in contemporary Europe it prevents arms races and conflicts between the great continental powers. Simultaneously, NATO should undertake activities in order to improve its abilities to respond to a wider scale of hostilities in the future.⁸⁸

Finally, John E. Peters identified the role of NATO as an institution acting like a fire brigade, where the scale of conflict is limited by CFE resolutions. In spite of the fact that NATO has been successful considering its experience in the post-cold war period, CFE shouldn't be expected to protect Europe from the local conflicts. Although NATO is obliged to improve its ability to respond to small conflicts, both the alliance and CFE are responsible for strengthening security and stability in Europe.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 17-18.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 19-20.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 20-21.

B. VIEW OF CFE TREATY IN THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND GERMANY

After signing the CFE treaty, the military order of the European continent was significantly changed. Some nations, which played and still play an important role in Europe from a historical point of view, were considerably influenced by this event. The following introduces how the CFE treaty was seen from the United States', Russian and German points of view. It seems interesting how the countries historically observed as hegemonies, or even aggressors, approached the CFE issue.

In July 10, 1992, Press Secretary Fitzwater stated that,

...CFE is a key indication of the new states' commitment to achieving lower and more stable levels of conventionally forces in Europe. Along with our treaty partners, the United States has worked hard to make CFE a reality. In the end, it was achieved because all participants, East and West, recognized that CFE's unprecedented force reductions, information exchanges, and verification provisions are the cornerstone for efforts to further improve European security in the years ahead ⁹⁰

The statement mentioned above confirms that, after signing the CFE treaty in 1990, the United States was very active in the area of implementing treaty resolutions and helping other European nations adjust to the new military order.

The multinational inspection teams led by U.S. inspectors was an opportunity for allied governments to broader understand the activities connected with the introduction of the CFE treaty resolutions in Europe. The U.S. teams were usually accompanied by representatives from the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Denmark. In spite of the fact that U.S. inspections were conducted in a multinational environment, makeup of escort groups consisted of Americans only.⁹¹

From observation, the American officers were very solid during the conduct of verification procedures. The evening or even late-night hours were no obstacle to them to perform their assigned tasks such as briefings, for example.

⁹⁰ George Bush Presidential Library and Museum, *Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92071002.html> (accessed Jan, 24, 2005).

⁹¹ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 185.

The Chief of Operations, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) European Operations Command, the U.S. Marine Corps Officer, Colonel Lawrence G. Kelly,⁹² claimed that “U.S. inspectors occasionally skipped lunch when conducting inspections and that escorts were obliged to assist inspectors in carrying out an inspection, even if that meant missed meal.⁹³”

The United States inspectors were strict as far as the loyalty to the CFE treaty decisions was concerned. Even despite the flexibility during performed missions, U.S. inspectors accomplished their task in high level.⁹⁴ Moreover, the establishment of a U.S. liaison officer post was an example of protecting American interests, while conducting Eastern inspections within a NATO state.⁹⁵

The policy of President George H. W. Bush appears as an example of involvement in CFE matters. The issue of the CFE treaty became highly important especially after the dissolution of Soviet Union. In spite of the multilateral character of CFE negotiations, discussing the key points made the consultations two-sided. The Eastern European nations, as well as NATO countries, understanding the enormous significance of CFE treaty, accepted the agreement between Washington and Moscow. The West realized that an agreement reached by the United States would be valuable for them.⁹⁶

President William J. Clinton represented a similar point of view concerning the importance of the CFE treaty in the world after the post-Communist period.

In his speech concerning the updated version of the 1990 CFE treaty, he stated that “In all these ways, the adapted Treaty will enhance peace, security and stability throughout Europe. Therefore, it is in America’s national interest to sign it now, and to

⁹², Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 64.

⁹³ Ibid., 112.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 220.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 188.

⁹⁶ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 249-250.

lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. At the same time, in order to reap these benefits, we must have confidence that there will be real compliance.⁹⁷”

Today’s approach of the United States toward the CFE treaty was expressed in the statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Stephen Rademaker, who said that “...the United States stands firmly by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and looks forward to the entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty. This has been our position since the Agreement on Adaptation was signed at Istanbul in 1999 and it is our position today...⁹⁸”

The Russian approach toward the CFE treaty was influenced mainly by “military traditions” inherited after the dissolution of Soviet Union. The willingness to reestablish the great and militarily powerful empire was still noticeable after 1991.

Between the years 1989 and 1991, the number of Soviet Armed Forces dropped from 5.3 million men to 2.72 million soldiers belonging to the Russian federation.⁹⁹ President Gorbachev initiated large-scale reductions in manpower and armaments following the signing of the CFE treaty.¹⁰⁰ After 1990, this event contributed to the rising of mutual empathy between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization bloc. It took a short time before the Russian authorities realized that forces authorized for deployment on the southern flank of the country were not able to ensure the appropriate security for the state.¹⁰¹

This situation contributed to unwillingness by high military authorities to implement the CFE treaty resolutions. Since that time Russia has never fully agreed with the obligations of the CFE agreement.

⁹⁷Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, “Disarmament Diplomacy,” *CFE Treaty Amended Against Background of War in Chechnya*, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd42/42cfe.htm> (accessed January 25, 2005).

⁹⁸ Embassy of the United States in London, “Arms Control & Non Proliferation,” *United States Firmly Committed to Conventional Arms Treaty*, <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/acda384.html> (accessed Jan, 24, 2005).

⁹⁹ William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (Yale University Press, 1998), 272.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Archie Brown, *Contemporary Russian Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 424.

According to Adam Boger, “Russia has consistently complied with its overall numerical limits and the requirements of the inspection and information regimes...¹⁰²” Those complaints, which existed even before the signing of the CFE treaty, were at the beginning dismissed by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, in 1993, NATO leaders were requested by Boris Yeltsin to revise the treaty.¹⁰³ The deployment of Russian forces in the area of “flanks” (described in the next chapter) is an issue that causes the main disagreement between Russia and the West.

The war in Chechnya was a factor that changed the approach of some states like Germany, Britain and the United States toward the CFE’s concerns in Russia. After this event, this group of countries was against implementation of any amendments to the treaty before the review conference planned for 1996.¹⁰⁴

Stationing Russian troops on the territory of Moldova and Georgia was another example of disagreement with CFE treaty decisions. Russia, nevertheless, explained that “near abroad” deployment of troops is crucial to the country’s security.¹⁰⁵ In November 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “...Problems of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Georgia and Transdniestria are being resolved in accordance with the bilateral agreements reached in Istanbul and with interested support from our CFE Treaty partners ¹⁰⁶”

Boger defines Russian ignorance toward the CFE treaty as “a result of the inappropriateness of the CFE document as a method of limiting Russia’s actions within its own territory and near abroad...¹⁰⁷” Finally, Russia’s conduct of activities connected

¹⁰² Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, “The Defense Monitor,” *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

¹⁰³ Jane M O Sharp, “Let’s make a deal: NATO and CFE,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 51, no. 2 (March 1995): 19-21.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.,

¹⁰⁵ Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, “The Defense Monitor,” *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

¹⁰⁶ Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, “Disarmament Diplomacy,” *Putin Statement on CFE Treaty*, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd52/52cfe.htm> (accessed Jan, 25, 2005).

¹⁰⁷ Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, “The Defense Monitor,” *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

with its national security is considered to unconcern CFE treaty terms. Simultaneously, Boger makes the argument that NATO is not interested in pressuring Russia to obey the CFE resolutions. He states that “NATO nations seem more interested in keeping Russia a party to the CFE treaty than in protecting the sovereignty and security of the states in Russian near abroad ¹⁰⁸”

Examining the German approach to the CFE treaty is interesting taking into consideration the German offensive during World War II and the reunification of Germany. Despite those crucial historical events, Germans were and still are, good partners in the accomplishment of CFE verification tasks.

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic, Germany was recognized as a unified state. Simultaneously, during this time many European countries like Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia started revolutions that resulted in the collapse of communist governments. Factors like large, combined armed forces in both countries, and willingness to take control over continental Europe in the past were key concerns during CFE treaty negotiations. However, aspects such as German Chancellor Kohl’s promise of joint forces reduction and “Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic on the Personal strength of German Armed Forces,” stated that the German military forces would be cut.¹⁰⁹ After all, before the CFE treaty entered into force, the former GDR equipment was used for studying Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) of the Soviet army. Moreover, Germany established the Federal Armed Forces Verification Center in Geilenkirchen, which was an institution responsible for inspectors’ training (including Russian language) and the organization of inspection teams.¹¹⁰ Additionally, this organization took care about monitoring all activities connected with CFE treaty. Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, director of the Center, explained that “The main,

¹⁰⁸ Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, “The Defense Monitor,” *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

¹⁰⁹ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 8-9.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 136-137.

reason for the establishment of the center was Germany's foreseeable workload in the area of the CFE Treaty. Germany had more CFE sites than did Soviet Union.¹¹¹"

Finally, considering NATO nations, Germany was a country that developed the most wide-ranging training program and was for treaty implementation. The presence of numerous NATO's installations on the German territory was a crucial concern in the process of conducting training.¹¹²

C. CREATING A NEW STRATEGIC SHAPE OF EUROPE

The CFE treaty signed in November 1990 contributed to significant strategic changes on the European continent. This document is seen not only as a "formal" end of the Cold War, but also as a factor identified with the reduction of armaments, troops, and the formation of new strategic centers. The "flanks zones", Russian military equipment deployed abroad, the Black Sea region and the redeployment of U.S. troops from Western Europe created a totally new view of the European map, which sometimes were even concerned as the new threats.

During the final months of negotiating the CFE treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of TLE were relocated to the military installations east of the Ural Mountains. This activity was still considered legal due to incomplete work of the treaty. However, after signing the CFE treaty in November 1990, the number of equipment of other states was disturbed by deployed armaments of the Soviet Union. For some observers, Soviet military authorities were suspected of circumventing the CFE treaty, because the Soviet Union was the only country that moved armaments outside its border.¹¹³

Similarly, through the problems connected with the "flank zones", which are described in the next chapter of this thesis, Russia was not always viewed as a state fulfilling CFE treaty commitments.

The limits within the zones mentioned above were established in order to prevent a potential attack on the two fronts, which included Turkey in the south, Norway in the

¹¹¹ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996) 57.

¹¹² Ibid., 148.

¹¹³ Ibid., 245.

north, and Southern Europe. The constraints concerning those areas were caused by fact that the USSR was the only country whose area straddled the flank zones.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, Turkey and Norway complained that such a high number of equipment deployed within the flank zones would place armaments along their borders.¹¹⁵

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as existence of 15 newly created states, caused the partition of the former Soviet Union's military equipment in order to ratify the CFE treaty. Moreover, Article V allowed Russia to keep about 10 percent of its total entitlements in active units within the territory of both flanks; and 85 percent in storage.¹¹⁶ In addition, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus became the southern border of Russia, which was obliged to divide its flank equipment with that of the other newly created states such as Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, the flanks were not always identified with the threats from the Russian side.

For example, it was stated in 1995 that "...Given that West has no intention of becoming involved in conflicts in the former Soviet Union, there is no strong argument against allowing Russia to enforce security on its southern periphery..."¹¹⁸

The redeployment of American troops was another matter that contributed to significant military changes on the European continent after signing the CFE treaty.

As a remnant of the Cold War period, in 1990, about 325,000 U.S. personnel were stationed throughout Europe. Moreover, there were more than 1,500 sites in the area of Europe, where those forces (and armaments) were located. According to the CFE treaty, countries that deployed conventional military equipment outside their own territory, but

¹¹⁴ Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, "The Defense Monitor," *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

¹¹⁵ Jane M O Sharp, "Let's make a deal: NATO and CFE," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 51, no. 2 (March 1995): 19-21.

¹¹⁶ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 247.

¹¹⁷ Columbia International Affairs Online. Adam Boger, "The Defense Monitor," *Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion*, http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/cdi/cdi_2000/cdi2000_10/cdi_10b.html (accessed Jan, 11, 2005).

¹¹⁸ "International: CFE Flank," *OxResearch*, (October 17, 1995): 1.

within the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals), were recognized as “stationing states.” Those armaments were subjected to CFE’s resolutions and inspections, and the stationing states were authorized to provide escorts during CFE procedures.¹¹⁹

There were 8,128 CFE TLE pieces of American forces reduced or withdrawn from the Western Europe. Simultaneously, this number represented a 63 percent reduction of U.S. offensive forces stationed within the territory of Europe.¹²⁰ However, not all reduction processes can be identified with the large-scale withdrawal. This time, there was a need to deploy U.S. combat military forces to the Middle East for the purposes of the Gulf War, as well as to reduce its personnel due to the end of the Cold War period.¹²¹ After victory over Iraq in 1991, a large number of American troops, previously deployed in Europe, returned to military installations in the United States. The massive withdrawal of U.S. forces was illustrated by USAREUR’s Commander-in-Chief, General Crosbie E. Saint, who stated that in 1992 his command was “averaging 500 soldiers a day leaving Europe.”¹²²

However, in spite of the fact that managing the force’s withdrawal was a time consuming process, the United States was able to return 157 European (mainly German) installations to their host states.¹²³

Finally, one of the factors that influenced the post-CFE treaty military order of Europe was the issue of the Black Sea Fleet.

The weakening of the Black Sea Fleet through the continuous fight with the Ukraine over the basic rights was one of Russia’s concerns after 1991.¹²⁴ Those two countries’ failure to comply with the CFE treaty didn’t reduce their treaty-limited equipment of naval infantry and coastal defense units subordinated to the Black Sea Fleet. The fact that the fleet was manned mainly by Russian sailors and officers caused

¹¹⁹ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 37.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 259.

¹²¹ Ibid., 258.

¹²² Ibid., 54.

¹²³ Ibid., 55.

¹²⁴ Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott, *Russian Military Reform 1992-2002* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 168.

difficulties in partitioning the fleet. In June 1993, the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to split the fleet in half until the year 1996. The Russian military authorities, as well as the naval officers, opposed the loss of territory from the naval bases. After a few years of negotiations (September 1993, April 1994, February 1996), Pavel Grachev, Russian Defense Minister, stopped the division due to a disagreement over the basing of the Russian fleet. After all, after intensive debating, neither Russia nor the Ukraine destroyed any of the armaments of coastal defense units and naval infantry assigned to Black Sea Fleet, which in consequence put them in a position of not being in obedience with the CFE treaty.¹²⁵

The CFE treaty was a factor that significantly influenced security and stability in Europe after the year 1990. In “cooperation” with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it plays a key role in preventing potential conflicts on the European continent. However, “forcing” countries to reduce their armaments is not sufficient in itself. All examples of non-compliance with the CFE treaty could become suspicious for other nation. What is more, new strategic centers (and changes) described above should be considered as essential as far as the planning of future European security is concerned. In the process of reduction and verification of conventional armed forces, the good will of politicians and military authorities appears as an indispensable factor.

¹²⁵ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 243-245.

IV. CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES VERIFICATION IN EUROPE: STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES

A. PROBLEMS EXISTING AFTER SIGNING THE CFE TREATY

1. Post-CFE General Dilemmas

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was a core document, which significantly influenced security and stability on the continent after the post-Cold War period. Keeping an officially established number of military equipment by both the Eastern block, represented by countries of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), and NATO members, eliminated the possibility of military hostilities. Simultaneously, the CFE agreement is considered as the first one in which the reduction of armaments in some way forced both countries' blocks to pave the way for permanent peace in Europe.

However, in spite of the long time, which led to signing the CFE treaty, its ratification and implementation, one can argue if there are no threats for security and stability in Europe. This part of the thesis allows the opportunity to examine the following questions: What problems arose after the CFE treaty ratification? What could be their possible solutions? To what extent was implementation of the treaty effective as far as European security is concerned? Analyzing the attitudes toward the CFE treaty, right away after signing documents, as well as the policy of the engaged countries, is indispensable in providing a complete answer to those questions. Moreover, it will be interesting to gain more knowledge about the issue of CFE verification in contemporary Europe; and to foresee its tendencies in the near future.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed on November 19, 1990, in Paris. This fact appeared as a successful accomplishment of long months of negotiations between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. In spite of fact that the signed document was essential itself, Europe this time went through very significant changes. The descent of the Warsaw Pact, and the fall of the Berlin Wall significantly changed the situation on the European continent.¹²⁶ However, immediately after the agreement's signing, it was realized that the CFE treaty

¹²⁶ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 1.

was not perfect in structure, and left some important European security issues unsolved. Most of them were connected with the Soviet Union, which was in the process of collapsing.

Right away after signing, the CFE treaty became a major issue discussed in Soviet and Western politics. The last few months of agreement negotiations were considered as “a race against time”¹²⁷, during which the size of military armed forces became the main issue on the agenda. On one hand, the Soviet military leadership was not so excited about the CFE treaty, which significantly reduced its operational capabilities. On the other hand, the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were ready to agree to the negotiated CFE rules. In late 1990, the conventional arms control policy was challenged by conservative communist party representatives, leaders from a variety of security organizations, and the defense industry. Such a situation caused a major dispute in the West about the Soviet Union’s fulfillment of its (signed before) obligations.¹²⁸

After the declaration of independence, there was a need in the former Soviet Union republics to create national armed forces. Especially the issue of equipment ownership was discussed between Russian and Ukrainian officials. While Kiev stated that military equipment located on Ukrainian soil was its property, the General Staff argued that all of the Soviet armaments belonged to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia temporarily expressed its opinion that the former Soviet military belonged to the CIS, but if the Commonwealth of Independent States started to be a worthless successor, then Russia should be the only inheritor of the Soviet Union, which owns all property outside the Russian borders. Russia’s inheritance of the entire corps of former officers and the Soviet Union’s strategic point of view significantly influenced the internal CIS disagreement over security policy in 1992. Russia reacted immediately to the “privatization” of the former Soviet forces by the Ukraine. The officers, for example, were ordered not to administer the Ukrainian oath. Russian senior commanders and officials attacked the Ukrainian leadership for claims of military equipment within

¹²⁷ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe’s Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 117.

¹²⁸ Ibid.,

Ukrainian borders. There were cases where some serviceman deserted or defected.¹²⁹ This was not the only problem after the signing of the CFE treaty.

There was no denying that close connections between the government of Russia and the high command of newly independent state were not gone. Russian military leadership was criticized by some non-Russian representatives, that Russia treats other states as an annex of its own territory.¹³⁰

The significant political differences among the CIS states concerning the method of succession from the Soviet Union made the CFE treaty enormously difficult to fulfill. Despite the fact that Western politicians were focused mainly on assuring appropriate central control of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, issues of the CFE treaty connected with Russia, as well as consequences of Ukrainian independence, were still actively considered by officials in Brussels and Vienna. The agreement among the alliance about the treaty's entering into force was achieved slowly at the end of the year 1991. Every person involved with CFE matters knew that the treaty could not be renegotiated and that it had to enter into force with a minimum number of changes. However, the CFE treaty allowed the process of changes in Article XX.¹³¹ According to it,

any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, which shall circulate it to all the States Parties. If an amendment is approved by all the State Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.”¹³²

Finally, the Western states expected the CFE treaty to enter into force (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) during the Helsinki CSCE summit, planned for July 1992. In order to bring the CFE treaty into force after the breakup of the Soviet empire, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed the creation of a “High

¹²⁹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 166.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 169.

¹³¹ Ibid., 191.

¹³² On-Site Inspection Agency, *Treaty Between the Twenty Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of their Conventional Armed Forces in Europe*, 19 November 90, 21.

Level Working Group” (HLWG).¹³³ The activity of this organization was very important considering the CFE treaty entry into the force. Regularly held HLWG meetings were attended by officials on a very high level. Solving all matters connected with the CFE by officials from former newly created countries was one of the major problems after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The HLWG used the political importance of NATO to encourage ratification of the CFE treaty among them. Moreover, HLWG meetings explained the idea of the agreement to the leaders of the former Soviet republics who were not ready to deal with the technical side of the CFE treaty.¹³⁴ The first meeting of HLWG took place on January 10, 1992. The Russian delegate, Vladimir Petrovsky, argued that Russia was the only successor state to the Soviet Union, and that it on its own should ratify the CFE treaty. According to Petrovsky, the later implementation packages for the treaty with other former Soviet republics should be worked out by Moscow on a bilateral basis. This proposition was rejected by the delegations from those republics, which were supported by other CFE treaty participants. In addition, Russia was informed by Western states that they had recognized this country as the single successor only in terms of nuclear weapons and the UN Security Council seat. Conventional arms control responsibilities had to be distributed among the republics.¹³⁵ Finally, during this meeting it was agreed that:

- The CFE treaty should not be renegotiated and should be implemented as quickly as possible,
- Treaty obligations (all parties of the treaty) should be apportioned among the former Soviet Union republics, which are obliged to work collectively and in full conformity,
- Some changes of the treaty could be made after its entry into force, however they should be kept at a minimum level and formalized after entry into the force.¹³⁶

Nevertheless, the process mentioned above needed time to accommodate, which was not so easy considering the brand-new situation in Eastern Europe after the demise of the Soviet Union.

¹³³ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 191.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 192.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 193.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 194.

In general, splitting the former Soviet Union Empire into fifteen new states appeared as the main obstacle to CFE treaty implementation. What is more, with the exception of Russia, the created republics lacked the bureaucratic power and suitable infrastructure needed to implement CFE reforms in a proper way. During the first months after regaining independence there were a lot of problems within the armed forces of newly created states, which included: low level of discipline, robberies, desertion, uncertain jurisdiction, and considerable turnover at the command level, which caused tremendous administrative problems in the CFE treaty's resolution fulfillment. There is no denying that the implementation process was much easier for newly independent states such as Russia, the Ukraine or Belarus, than for other former Soviet Union republics represented by Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. In the case of Russia, vastly inherited arms control bureaucracy helped this country to deal with the technical difficulties of CFE agreement implementation. In the case of countries like the Ukraine or Belarus, even the lack of skilled arms control bureaucracies was not a serious obstacle to agreement implementation. They both were clear about the ownership of military equipment, and took control of all conventional equipment on their own territories.¹³⁷ There was another concern connected with the deployment of the Soviet Union's troops (equipment) on the area of countries – satellites during the Cold War period.

The Soviet equipment, which was withdrawn from the areas of Germany, Poland and the Baltic states, counted toward Russian holdings of Treaty-limited Equipment (TLE). Despite the fact that returning armaments added directly to the Russian reduction accountability, Russian authorities wanted it. The reason was it was usually more modernized and better maintained in comparison with equipment's units stationed in Russia. The fact that not all equipment from Europe went to Russia (Belarus and the Ukraine received some of it) reflected the instability of the amount of TLE in Belarus and the Ukraine during the first three years after signing the treaty. Taking over the equipment in Europe by non-Russian former republics forced CFE force reduction

¹³⁷ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 225.

liabilities of the Ukraine, Belarus and Russia to be revised.¹³⁸ The smaller former Soviet Union states were rather not successful in CFE treaty implementation. In the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia, the undeveloped bureaucracy was not able to collect data required by the CFE treaty.¹³⁹

Another problem directly related to CFE treaty ratification was the issue of inspection in the newly created post-Soviet states. Although separated by boundaries, the feeling of unity and sometimes-common goals could be recognized.

The CFE treaty gave the newly established independent states (former Russian republics) the right to verify each other's military forces. NATO itself disliked the idea of inter-group inspections because it didn't allow the alliance to conduct the maximum number of verifications (quotas) that was connected with the investigation of any suspicious activities within the territories of Eastern states. Moreover, NATO officials were afraid that states would request an inspection when their yearly quota had been exhausted by others countries (in this case by former Soviet states). Developed by NATO, the "Enhanced Cooperation Program" (ECP) partly solved the concerns about conducting inspections. According to the ECP, Eastern inspectors were allowed to accompany Western inspection teams during 20 percent of NATO's inspections of declared-sites and 25 percent of reduction inspections. There was hope that such activity would be an effective tool in discouraging the Eastern states from inspecting each other.¹⁴⁰

2. The European Flanks-Bone of Contention

The issue of "flanks" was one of the most serious problems that arose after the signing of the CFE treaty. The Russian Federation and the Ukraine asked to be relieved of the CFE Article V limitation of TLE. This equipment was located in the flank areas of their states, which included Leningrad and the North Caucasus Military Districts (situated in the Russian Federation and Southeastern Ukraine).¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 226.

¹³⁹ Ibid.,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 229-230.

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 10-11.

Norway and Turkey were very concerned that the withdrawal of Soviet Union forces from Central and Eastern Europe might result in a considerable increase of Soviet forces near their frontiers. The original restrictions permitted the Soviet Union to keep within the northern and southern flank's sectors no more than 1,850 tanks, 2,775 artillery pieces, and 1,800 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) in active units. Moreover, Soviets were allowed to additionally hold, in designated storage sites, 1,000 tanks, 900 artillery, and 800 ACVs. One year after the signing the CFE treaty, the Soviet Union was dissolved, and several newly created Soviet states signed the Tashkent Agreement. According to this document, the Soviet Union's military equipment was divided between Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Moldova. Both countries – Russia and the Ukraine – were significantly limited as far as the TLE was concerned. Russian active units this time were allowed to maintain up to 700 tanks, 580 ACVs and 1,280 artillery pieces (600 tanks, 800 ACVs, and 400 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites). Active units in the Ukraine were permitted to accommodate in the flank zone 280 tanks, 350 ACVs and 390 artillery pieces (400 tanks and 500 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites). Such a situation forced Russia and the Ukraine in 1992 to request other CFE parties for relief from the flank limits, which seemed to them too restrictive.¹⁴² These limitations of TLE significantly reduced the military utility in both countries. Russia, for example, was obliged to divide about 10 percent of its total TLE kept in active units between the Leningrad Military District and the Caucasus territory.¹⁴³

Solving the flank problem took over two years. All of the CFE states were involved in this process in order to achieve the best resolution. The United States during this time conducted intense disputes with Turkey, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In addition, American officials debated with non-treaty states, such as the neutral Nordic and Baltic states. The NATO countries accepted the common point of view in the flanks discussions, which later on was

¹⁴² Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 14-15.

¹⁴³ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 232.

presented to the Ukraine, Russia and the other parties of CFE. The multilateral negotiations among NATO Allies within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) took place in Vienna. The bilateral discussions were held in capitals.¹⁴⁴

In this situation, the involvement of some high-level politicians became indispensable. The specific character of Europe, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was an argument which a lot of diplomats were concerned about.

After Ukrainian ambassador Kostenko's formal presentation of the flanks problem to the JCG on September 14, 1993, Russian President Yeltsin wrote a letter to all NATO leaders. In his message, Yeltsin emphasized the radical changes that appeared in the political situation of Europe, as well as the complicated economic and social problems of the Russia Federation connected with the redeployment of troops from Eastern Europe. He also stated that the districts of Leningrad and North Caucasus made up over half the territory of European Russia, and that restrictions imposed were unfair in comparison with those imposed on any Western state.¹⁴⁵ In general, two security concerns were taken into consideration by the United States and other CFE signatories as the Russia and the Ukraine called for flanks limits relief. First of all, there was a need to preserve the integrity of the CFE treaty. There were a few events where the Russian representatives threatened to support their withdrawal from the CFE treaty if their demands connected with flanks' issue were not sufficiently met. In this case, the dissolution of the agreement would influence significantly the United States, NATO Allies, and consequently the European security situation. The Russian government's officials were concerned that if Russia would implement all of CFE's conditions, its security would be in danger. Second of all, the West realized that any adjustment to the CFE flank arrangements must not affect the security of any CFE signatory, as well as any country located near the Russian flanks. While the military security of the United States and the majority of NATO countries were not affected directly by the Russian flank

¹⁴⁴ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 15-16

¹⁴⁵ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 11.

limits, their security was indirectly affected by the territories of Turkey, Norway, Finland, the Ukraine, Moldova and the Caucasus and Baltic states.¹⁴⁶

One of the people who tried to solve the flank problem was First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant General V. M. Zhurbenko, who proposed the postponement of Article V, and suggested that Russia would be willing to consider some additional restrictions connected with the prohibition of an increase in military forces in the Leningrad Military District, and their “over concentration” in the North Caucasus region.¹⁴⁷ In January 1994, the Head of the Russian Delegation, V. N. Kulebiakin, stated that:

... if someone is nourishing the hope that, by not doing anything but waiting for the end to the period of reductions the problem of the flank restrictions will disappear in and of itself, these reckonings are absolutely groundless. If the next six months this knot has not been united, then it will necessary to cut it. (Emphasis added.)¹⁴⁸

On one hand, this statement presents the strong will for negotiations with the West, which would finally lead into the problem solution. On the other hand, however, it presented a point of view that emphasizes a need of Russian self-determination in the flank matter.

In general, the Russian leadership expressed seven reasons explaining why the CFE treaty should be changed. First, the tremendous changes within the political environment in the world made the basis of the treaty no longer valid. In this view, Russia is discriminated against in the treaty by placing internal limits with respect to deployment of forces on its territory. Second, a new approved Russian military doctrine required balanced military defense within the area of the whole country. Third, the North Caucasus Military District, which was considered in the past as a rear area, now became a border district, which totally changed the logic of the flanks. Fourth, the Muslim fundamentalism developed mainly in southern area arose as the main challenge to

¹⁴⁶ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 15.

¹⁴⁷ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 11-12.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

Russian security. Fifth, from economic and social points of view, the North Caucasus Military District was better prepared for stationing military forces returning to Russia due to an already existing infrastructure. Sixth, changes to the CFE treaty do not symbolize a model as it has been developing during the intervening years. Finally, it was suggested by the Russian spokesman that while their government is a strong follower of the CFE agreement, reductions and inspections appear as the key elements of the agreement. Moreover, it was believed the treaty itself was not well considered by many members of the military. Relatively quickly, Russian leaders pointed out that they are not interested in increasing the total TLE's allocation under the CFE agreement, but in removing of the flanks restrictions on what equipment could be deployed in the flanks.¹⁴⁹

There were many concerns about the next step that Russia would take in case of disagreement between it and the other parties of the CFE treaty. Withdrawal from the CFE treaty, refusal of Article V of the document, dealing with international repercussion (while maintaining its holdings in the flank zones), transfer of armaments to supported and controlled armed groups on the areas of smaller former republics were the most probable Russian courses of action.¹⁵⁰

There were few aspects that Russia considered when it agreed to the special conditions on the flank zone in 1990. This time, the Soviet general staff still viewed Central Europe as a region of possible military operations. This time the southern region was not considered as a potential theater of military hostilities in a future war with NATO. Because of that, the high limits of the CFE treaty in the central zone harmonized with the relatively low limits in the flank zone, which were established according to traditional Soviet strategic orientation. Moreover, strategic and political reasons pushed Russia to deploy more military equipment in the flank zone than was officially allowed by the CFE treaty. The low living standard of military officers in Russia (mainly junior officers) was one of the matters discussed on the civil-military level. There was a problem with providing housing for officers returning from their previous foreign deployments. This problem became bigger when, because of the CFE flank rule, only a

¹⁴⁹ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 13-14.

¹⁵⁰ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 238.

limited number of military units could be redeployed in Leningrad or the North Caucasus Military District, which were considered well-developed regions.¹⁵¹ According to one Russian report,

The construction of a further nine military towns (with more than 10,000 apartments) is nearing completion [in southern Russia] and Russian units due to be withdrawn from German territory will go there. But unless the problem of the flank limitation (is) resolved we will have to create the necessary facilities in other locations. That will entail a considerable rise in the cost of construction, which is more economical in the south than in other regions, such as the north.¹⁵²

The Ukraine was a country where the flank limitation reflected the political and military situation as well. It was believed that the flank limitation in the Ukraine must be reviewed once again. The defense experts stated that their country needed better distribution of forces within the country. In case of flank limitation, the Ukraine would be forced to deploy the bulk of its forces in the Carpathian Military District. Such a solution would be a violation of the NATO aim of reducing the number of forward deployed forces. Moreover, in order to provide sufficient time for military planners, the decision had to be taken by the middle of 1994. There is no denying that this situation was tightly connected with Russo-Ukrainian aspects such as: the dissolution of the Kiev Military District shared by the two countries, the presence of Russian military in Moldova, and the increasing trend of Russian nationalism in the Crimea. Additionally, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine were obliged to reach agreement about the distribution of TLE that was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet. The Ukrainians, of course, were very concerned about any flanks relief given to Russia because of security reasons. Finally, similar to the case of the Russian Federation, implementation of flank restrictions demanded high finances for constructing new military facilities in the Carpathian Military District and the Northern Odessa region.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 233.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*,

¹⁵³ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 16-17.

The weak economic situation and the impossibility of investing large sums of money into the building of military facilities was expressed by military officials, who claimed that the decisions taken by CFE parties were unfavorable to the Ukraine.

In September 1994, General Gennadiy Gurin stated that,

Under the present conditions of our economy, we do not have the means needed to relocate troops in order to fulfill the flank limits, and we want only one thing – to retain the existing infrastructure of military units. Proposals tied to the possibility of disbanding troops do not stand up to criticism, since disbanding troops is more expensive than relocating them, due to unavoidable costs of providing housing for officers' families, paying compensations, etc.¹⁵⁴

In the case of the Ukraine, the change of the flank rule would permit it to spread Ukrainian military forces more regularly within the territory. For Ukrainians, as for Russians, the south was considered as the area of possible military threat.¹⁵⁵

In order to end the flank problem, the West (the United Kingdom and the United States) proposed a few potential solutions. They suggested that the Russian troops in the North Caucasus could be “light” – equipped with military equipment not limited by the CFE treaty. Small caliber artillery, trucks, and infantry weapons seemed to be more suitable for the Caucasus terrain. What is more, the West suggested that there is no flank limitation for Russians as far as aircraft are concerned, and that equipment for Russian units located in the flank zone could be kept outside the territory, but at an appropriate distance that allows for rapid deployment.¹⁵⁶ In September 1995, NATO presented the proposal at the JCG in order to finally resolve the flank problem. The coalition suggested to:

- Keep the CFE flank limits unchanged;
- Remove some areas from the Russian and Ukrainian flanks to make the territory smaller;

¹⁵⁴ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 17-18.

¹⁵⁵ Richard A. Falkenrath, *Shaping Europe's Military Order, The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), 237.

¹⁵⁶ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 19.

- Restrict the number of TLE in the territories eliminated from the flank zone; and
- Implement transparency and verification procedures within the old as well as new created zones.¹⁵⁷

In November 1995, the JCG approved a plan for a flank agreement, following aspects proposed by NATO. A large number of consultations and debates took place in Vienna and other capitals in order to finalize the details of the general outline. After all of these, the final agreement on the flank issue was finally reached at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996. The “Flank Agreement” stated that territories mentioned below would no longer be included in the flank zone:

Odessa oblast in Ukraine;

Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts in southern Russia;

An eastern part of the Rostov oblast in southern Russia;

Kushchevskaya repair facility in southern Russia and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya; and

Pskov oblast in northern Russia.¹⁵⁸

Finally, in spite of the fact that the flank limit appeared as the most important, there was still a problem that made the implementation of the CFE treaty more difficult to accomplish.

The issue was the cost of the destruction of Russian military equipment after the reduction of forces. It was estimated that the cost of destroying a single tank was over 800,000 rubles. Even so-called “environmental destruction” of armament was discussed in the JCG forum to avoid high costs. These costs were caused mainly by a usage of a large number of workers, high costs of energy, and a desire to recover the maximum quantity of metal from conducting this process. In addition as a commitment related to the treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to destroy about 16,000 TLE pieces moved east of the

¹⁵⁷ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 16.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Urals. Considered by Russia a “political” rather than “legal” obligation of the Tashkent Accord, by the middle of 1994, only a small part of this equipment was destroyed.¹⁵⁹

B. VERIFICATION FOCUS IN EUROPE NOWADAYS AND IN THE FUTURE

1. Conventional Arm Forces Verification Today

In contemporary Europe, the issue of the CFE treaty looks different from the early 1990s. New developing European economies, programs and enlargement of security institutions (NATO, EU) caused a different approach toward verification of armed forces today.

Considering the fact that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were dissolved rather rapidly, the CFE had quite a short time to prove its importance, but this goal became clear at the beginning of the early 1990s. In spite of the main aim, which was standing in front of CFE agreement, conducted verification contributed more to moderating tensions between the two blocs. Additionally, the treaty was a significant document in terms of concerns about the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of Eastern Europe. Even U.S. military forces that were stationed in Germany were inspected before their deployment to the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the importance of the CFE treaty on the area of European security was noticeable in smoothing U.S. – Russian relationships and easing the Russian point of view in the light of the NATO enlargement.¹⁶⁰

In spite of the end of Cold War period and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CFE treaty is significant for all participating states. It is believed that this document plays a main role in maintaining peace in the whole of Europe. In addition to the traditional role of the CFE agreement, it started to act as a crisis management instrument in Europe. The security problem, which confronts Europe today, is no longer devoted to preparing for surprising attacks. It seems that nowadays the matter of security lies within the states. Arms control obligations inherited after the signing of the CFE treaty are not sufficient for players who don't want stability and for whom conventional military forces are the

¹⁵⁹ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 27-28.

¹⁶⁰ Arms Control Association. Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Arms Control Today,” *Endgame: CFE Adaptation And the OSCE Summit*, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/mccso99.asp (accessed Nov. 26, 2004).

single instrument of agreement. The problem of the Balkans appears totally different in comparison with the problem of the post-Cold War establishment and the bloc-to-bloc confrontation. In case of East-West disputes, the CFE treaty was a document that prevented the escalation of conventional conflict. The Balkan crisis is characterized by the activity of local actors who violate international law and human rights. In this case, arms control is no longer a dispute between two confronting sides, but a tool helpful for disarmament procedures.¹⁶¹ The CFE, as well as NATO, have little impact as far as the current threats to European security and stability are concerned. In spite of the fact that the CFE may continue to regulate the limits of armed forces, the war between certain nations is rather impossible. Even if some states decide to fight each other, those conflicts would engage much smaller military forces than the CFE treaty allows.¹⁶²

The arms control challenge nowadays is to assure society that it can live, work, and move safe and freely within territories administered by other authorities. The feeling of stability at lower force levels and protection from potential foreign attack are as important as assurances that people can be secure. Sometimes, nevertheless, the CFE's principles are confused with its attributes. As a result, subsequent treaties are being negotiated. The Dayton Accord appears to be a good example of a situation where arms control provisions were patterned on the CFE's equipment, zones, and other matters. CFE models were used by officials even though the conflict in Bosnia was caused by totally different reasons than the confrontation between the East and West during the Cold War period.¹⁶³ John E. Peters, in his book titled "CFE and Military Stability in Europe," confirms the statement that having in mind a transformed security situation in Europe, the CFE treaty is much less devoted to typical Europe's problems. Its inspection regime and some features are not very helpful in solving of current concerns. The CFE inspection quotas, as well as the inspection system, are less suitable for today. Nowadays, more states are willing to inspect Russia and its neighbors than they were in the past.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 23-24.

¹⁶² John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 12.

¹⁶³ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 25.

¹⁶⁴ John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), XII.

Moreover, as experience shows, there is an unwritten agreement between the NATO members that they not inspect each other. For example, Poland after joining NATO in 1999 is inspected mainly by states - former Soviet Union's republics, which share a border with it (the Ukraine, Belarus).

The CFE treaty was successful in terms of the reducing of military equipment after the Cold War period. More than 50,000 tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft were destroyed or removed from the European continent in order to accomplish CFE obligations. The agreement is not the only tool responsible for arms control. There is no denying that the CFE, as well as a Vienna-based organization responsible for realization of treaty resolution, influence significantly the geopolitical situation in Europe. Russia (which recently used its own armed forces in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya) is still considered a superpower in Europe. The treaty still serves as a mechanism that helps to build confidence among European nations and to assure Russia that NATO enlargement will not pose any threat.¹⁶⁵

Even today, the policy of Russian President Vladimir Putin reflects the importance of the CFE treaty in Russia. Simultaneously, it emphasize that in spite of the formal end of Cold War era, the concerns about CFE agreement are still alive. Signed in 1990, the CFE treaty is continuously modernized and updated.

On July 19, 2004, Vladimir Putin signed a federal law on another updated CFE treaty ratification. For the time being, the treaty (innovated) version from 1999 is still in force, and will remain so, until all 30 members agree to the lastly modified document. Moreover, Russia is very concerned about the replacement of the original treaty because of new NATO members (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which don't have military equipment limits according to the old treaty. Those countries cannot sign the changed version until it is in force. According to Moscow, NATO could take advantage of the fact mentioned above and accumulate armed forces next to the Russian border.¹⁶⁶ Further evidence that the CFE problem is still debatable is the statement of Vladislav Chernov,

¹⁶⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Revision of the Flank Agreement: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 2.

¹⁶⁶ Wade Boese. "Dispute Over Russian Withdrawal from Georgia, Moldova Stall CFE Treaty," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 34, no. 7 (September 2004): 43.

the head of Russian delegation in the JCG. In his opinion, the CFE treaty has a character of “a silent sabotage” among the western countries. He stated that the western states are “looking for various excuses to detain ratification and entry into force of one of the most principal treaties in Europe – the CFE treaty, which, in case of its adoption, could contribute to strengthening stability and security in the European continent.¹⁶⁷” Additionally, Chernov emphasized that the ratification period of the CFE Treaty Adjustment Agreement is too long, and that the CFE treaty can better establish security and peace relations on the continent.¹⁶⁸

2. The Future of CFE Verification

It seems to be difficult to predict what will be the future of verification of arms control in Europe. The contemporary political and economical situation in the Continent is still changing, which creates the new challenges for CFE rigors.

The CFE treaty is planned to exist with no limit. While there may be little interest in enlargement of the document to other categories of military equipment, the Protocol of Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) must be continuously updated to include new models brought into service. Moreover, there is still a need for transforming the arms control process from a “quantitative” to a “qualitative” one. What is more, from the CFE perspectives, the issues like U.S. – European relationships and U.S. policy toward the Russian Federation, are significant.¹⁶⁹ For the time being, the issue of flank zones in Russia is unresolved. Lasting dissatisfaction with the flank agreement might force Russia to take some steps in order to increase its influence on the flanks region. It should be realized that some points of the CFE agreement might not be satisfactory for regulating stability in Europe. In case of Russian insistence on reconsidering the flank problem, greater interest in new stability measures can arise. There are a few possible scenarios of structural stability which include the creation of special exclusion zones with prohibited or limited TLE, as well as establishing sub zones which restrict TLE density in all states. There is a possibility that in order to

¹⁶⁷ “Russian Diplomat: West’s Stand Regarding CFE Treaty is ‘Silent Sabotage,’” *RIA Novosti*, (June 29, 2004): 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *The CFE Treaty: A Cold War Anachronism?* (U.S. Army War College, 1995), 28-33.

prevent local conflict (like Chechnya) some parts of countries' territory could be formally excluded from the treaty. It would be a useful tool for a government, which in order to defeat its enemies, would concentrate a sufficient number of TLE.¹⁷⁰

There is no denying that nowadays Russia is more interested in maintaining its current number of armed forces than in discussing any possible future reductions. Simultaneously, it could be a good way for future Russian leaders to save money by investing in a smaller but more capable army.¹⁷¹

According to John E. Peters, the negotiations between allies in the future would make little sense. In the era of NATO enlargement, the members of the alliance will not be interested in negotiating arms control matters with each other. Another challenge for CFE is to bring new members (like Baltic states) to the agreement. This membership would help to protect those states from Russia's pressures. Moreover, by annually collected data declarations, those states would ensure other neighbors about the lack of threats from their side.¹⁷² On July 21, 2004, the Baltic News Service published an article in which the Russian Foreign Ministry encouraged Baltic states like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to join the CFE treaty. It expressed a need for the elimination of the "grey areas" not covered by the arms control obligations in the following statement:

In this context, we stress the intentions of the Baltic states and Slovenia, as recorded within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, to join the adapted treaty after it enters into force. We also expect that those countries will comply with its goals and principles before they join the CFE treaty.¹⁷³

It must be realized that a sufficient level of armament is a subjective point of view. While it is sufficient for one country, another state can consider it as

¹⁷⁰ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 31-33.

¹⁷¹ British American Security Information Council Basic Publications. Jonathan Dean, "Occasional Papers on International Security Policy," *Future of the CFE Treaty*, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP17.htm> (accessed Nov, 26, 2004).

¹⁷² John E. Peters, *CFE and Military Stability in Europe*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 69-70.

¹⁷³ "Moscow Again Calls on Baltics to Join CFE Treaty." *Baltic News Service*, (July 21, 2004): 1.

overestimated. Because of this fact, there is a need for establishing joined demands and criteria, which allow estimating an appropriate sufficiency level for every country.¹⁷⁴

The CFE treaty seems to be helpful to European officials. This document allows them not to worry about states' military activity and cooperate actively in the area of political and economic matters. Moreover, the CFE agreement is supportive to the slow process of the Russian democracy, further enlargement of the European Union and activity of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

According to an article by Jonathan Dean, titled "Future of the CFE Treaty", Europe is a continent with too many weapons. The author suggests the new process of reduction that would include thirty members of CFE agreement, as well as Sweden, Finland and Austria. All of those countries would be placed in one of the following categories: large, medium and small, according to the total number of reducible equipment. The author proposes to reduce the following categories of forces during a ten-year period:

- Large category – 5% yearly;
- Medium category – 3% yearly;
- Small category – 1-2% yearly.¹⁷⁵

The author assumes that the proposition of the next force reduction in Western Europe (with budgets being under fiscal stress) would encourage further funds cuts. In the case of the United States, further negotiation about force reductions would create a stronger will of diminution of U.S. forces in Europe, no matter what the outcome of the debate would be. In spite of still-present tensions between the East and West, there is a high probability that the Western states, instead of discussing further force reduction, will focus on keeping the existing number of forces.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Jürgen Altmann, Henny van der Graaf, Patricia M. Lewis and Peter Markl, *Verification at Vienna: Monitoring Reductions of Conventional Armed Forces* (Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1992), 17.

¹⁷⁵ British American Security Information Council Basic Publications. Jonathan Dean, "Occasional Papers on International Security Policy," *Future of the CFE Treaty*, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP17.htm> (accessed Nov, 26, 2004).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

Summing up the arguments mentioned above, there are some conclusions to be drawn. There is no denying that the CFE treaty influenced significantly the security and stability in Europe. By its specific character, it reduced the numbers of military equipment, which finally, to a large degree, eliminated potential conflicts between both eastern and western blocs. However, continuous dissatisfaction of some newly created independent states (former republics of the Soviet Union), is evidence of a still-hostile policy toward the West. Bearing in mind the large amount of military equipment inherited by Russia or the Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those countries still pose a threat. In spite of long debates concerning the CFE issue, they are still willing to maintain quite a large number of armaments “just in case” of potential conflict. It is extremely difficult to debate possible solutions to those matters. One of them, from the point of view of this thesis, would be encouraging the membership of “troublemakers” in the alliance. However, the latest events in the eastern regions have confirmed the conviction that such an East – West cooperation is extremely improbable.

V. CONCLUSION

There is no denying that the signing of the CFE treaty was one of the most significant events which took place in Europe after World War II. This document appeared as a helpful tool to prevent possible conflicts on the European continent that could arise. Simultaneously, the treaty is a symbol of the end of the Cold War, which considerably influenced some countries that later on became treaty signatories.

Apart from being a conflict-preventive treaty, the CFE agreement caused the reduction of more than 38,500 armaments. At the same time, the treaty's verification measures appeared as the most detailed and complex in comparison with other arms control agreements.¹⁷⁷

The CFE treaty was a factor that significantly influenced security and stability in Europe after the year 1990. In cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it plays a key role in preventing potential conflicts on the European continent.

In connection with arms control, NATO should be identified as institution acting like a fire brigade, where the scale of conflict is limited by CFE resolutions. In spite of the fact that NATO has been successful considering its experience in the post-Cold War period, CFE shouldn't be expected to protect Europe from the local conflicts. Although NATO is obliged to improve its ability to respond to small conflicts, both the alliance and CFE are responsible for strengthening security and stability in Europe.¹⁷⁸

However, "forcing" countries to reduce their armaments is not sufficient in and of itself. All examples of non-compliance with the CFE treaty could become suspicious for other nations. What is more, new strategic centers created in Europe after 1990 should be considered an essential issue as far as the planning of future European security is concerned. In the process of reduction and verification of conventional armed forces, the good will of politicians and military authorities appears as an indispensable factor.

¹⁷⁷ Joseph P. Harahan and John C. Kuhn, III, *On-Site Inspections under the CFE Treaty* (Washington, D. C.: The On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), 8-9.

¹⁷⁸ John E. Peters, *The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe, The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), 20-21.

By its specific character, the CFE treaty reduced the numbers of military equipment, which finally, to a large degree, eliminated potential conflicts between both eastern and western blocs. However, continuous dissatisfaction of some newly created independent states (former republics of the Soviet Union), is evidence of a still-hostile policy toward the West. Bearing in mind the large amount of military equipment inherited by Russia or the Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, those countries still could be considered as a potential threat. In spite of long debates concerning the CFE problem, those countries are still willing to maintain quite a large number of armaments “just in case” of possible conflict. It is extremely difficult to debate possible solutions to those matters. One of them, from this thesis’ point of view, would be encouraging the membership of “troublemakers” in the alliance.

Finally, even if there are some designs on latent enlargement of military equipment within some nations, the resolutions of the CFE treaty are factors that discourage conspiracy of potential enemies. Personal experience shows that even though the job of the CFE inspector is pleasant and satisfying, simultaneously performed tasks are very demanding and responsible. At the same time, it is a source of pride being able to guard declarations of the CFE treaty and to secure the beautiful European Continent at the same time.

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